THE CRIMINAL ENFORCEMENT OF ANTITRUST LAW – THE IMPORTANCE

OF BUILDING AN ENFORCEMENT CULTURE AND HOW TO CREATE IT by O’Loughlin, Peter
116 
THE CRIMINAL ENFORCEMENT OF ANTITRUST LAW – THE IMPORTANCE 
OF BUILDING AN ENFORCEMENT CULTURE AND HOW TO CREATE IT 
Peter O’Loughlin* 
 
Abstract: There has been a proliferation of jurisdictions across the world seeking to use 
criminal sanctions to deter and punish cartels and many have enacted laws that criminalise this 
type of anticompetitive behaviour. However, other jurisdictions have failed to replicate the 
enviable success of the US. Reports to the OECD suggest that they have encountered 
difficulties ranging from procedural to legal, but also disincentives on the part of key players 
– like judges, the general public, prosecutors, and government – in the actual enforcement of 
such a regime. These experiences intimate that some of these jurisdictions – awestruck by the 
accomplishments of the US – have not developed the enforcement culture necessary to 
effectively implement and maintain a criminalised antitrust regime. This essay puts forward a 
rhetorical framework that other countries may draw upon when attempting to garner both 
public and political support in the criminalisation process. It will be argued that because of the 
global financial crisis leaving many countries in dire straits, regulators must seize this 
opportunity to leverage the universal concepts of inequality and financial hardship in 
demonstrating the pernicious nature of cartels and, as a result, highlight why the case for 
criminalisation is so strong. 
 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Justice Scalia described hardcore cartel activity1 as ‘the supreme evil’ of antitrust in Trinko.2 
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) also referred to this 
type of behaviour as ‘the most egregious’ violation of competition law.3 Indeed, such activity 
has been shown to increase the prices of goods and services artificially, reduce consumer 
welfare, and disincentivise businesses to innovate and respond to market changes.4 As the 
OECD explains:  
A successful cartel raises prices above the competitive level and reduces output. 
Consumers choose either not to pay the higher price for some or all of the cartelised 
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1 Anti-competitive arrangements between competitors to fix prices, rig bids, restrict output, or share markets. 
2 Verizon Communications Inc. v The Law Offices of Curtis Trinko 540 US 398 (2004). 
3 ‘Antitrust law’ and ‘Competition law’ are used synonymously in this essay. 
4 OECD, Report on the Nature and Impact of Hard Core Cartels and Sanctions Against Cartels Under National 
Competition Laws (DAFFE/COMP7 2002) 2. 
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product that they desire, thus forgoing the product, or they pay the cartel price and 
thereby unknowingly transfer wealth to the cartel operators. Further, a cartel shelters 
its members from full exposure to market forces, reducing pressures on them to control 
costs and to innovate. All of these adversely affect efficiency in a market economy.5 
As consensus around the economic harm caused by cartels has grown, so too has the 
debate about how best to tackle cartel activity, reflect its seriousness, and ‘ensure that it is 
detected, deterred, and punished’.6 Recently, there has been a proliferation of jurisdictions 
across the world seeking to use criminal sanctions to deter and punish this type of 
anticompetitive behaviour, and many have enacted laws that criminalise cartel activity.7 This 
is a product of the worldwide trend towards tougher sanctions against cartels advocated, in 
particular, by international organisations.8 Competition authorities also now work more closely 
together, for example through the International Competition Network (ICN). 9  As Scott 
Hammond summarises:10 
In the last two decades, the world has seen the proliferation of effective leniency 
programs, ever-increasing sanctions for cartel offenses, a growing global movement to 
hold individuals criminally accountable, and increased international cooperation among 
enforcers in cartel investigations.11 
With respect to criminal sanctions, their greatest proponent, and the most successful in 
their utilisation, has been the US. Criminal antitrust enforcement in this jurisdiction boasts a 
formidable record. As Joel Davidow commented in 2004:  
In the last fiscal year, defendants in [Department of Justice] Antitrust Division cases 
were sentenced to more than 10,000 jail days – a record – with an average sentence of 
more than 18 months. In the last four years, a total of over 75 years of imprisonment 
                                                 
5 ibid. 
6 Alison Jones and Rebecca Williams, ‘The UK Response to the Global Effort against Cartels: Is Criminalization 
Really the Solution?’ (2014) Journal of Antitrust Enforcement 1-26, 1. 
7 Gregory Shaffer, Nathaniel Nesbitt, and Spencer Waller, ‘Criminalizing Cartels: A Global Trend?’ (2011) 12 
Sedona Conference Journal Minnesota Legal Studies Research Paper No. 11-26, 8-9. 
8 OECD, Recommendation of the Council Concerning Effective Action Against Hard Core Cartels (C(98)35/Final 
1998). 
9 International Competition Network <http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/> accessed 16 August 
2014. 
10 US Deputy Assistant Attorney General for Criminal Enforcement of the Antitrust Division at the Department 
of Justice. 
11 Scott Hammond, ‘The Evolution of Criminal Antitrust Enforcement Over the Last Two Decades’ (24th Annual 
National Institute on White Collar Crime, Miami, Florida, 25 February 2010). 
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have been imposed on antitrust defendants, with more than 30 defendants receiving 
prison sentences of one year or longer.12  
This impressive record continues today. During the 2010-2013 period, the number of 
individuals sentenced to incarceration was 123 and the total amount of incarceration time 
imposed by the Court was 250 years.13 
The general premise of the justification for such sanctions is that because it is 
individuals who engage the cartel in the first place, imprisonment is arguably the most 
efficacious way to deter this type of behaviour. ‘Illegal conspiracies do not exist in the abstract; 
active participation by particular individuals is essential to the success of any conspiracy’.14 
Yet despite the attractiveness of criminal sanctions, other jurisdictions have failed to 
replicate the success of the US. Reports to the OECD suggest that countries that have joined 
the criminalisation movement have encountered difficulties ranging from procedural to legal, 
but also disincentives on the part of key players – like judges, the general public, prosecutors, 
and government – in the actual enforcement of such a regime. 15  For example, the UK 
Government criminalised cartel behaviour under Part 6 Enterprise Act 2002. 16  However, 
instead of the 6-10 prosecutions per year initially predicted, only three individuals have been 
prosecuted to date, all in relation to just one cartel – Marine Hoses.17 Furthermore, the ultimate 
prosecution of this cartel was largely down to help from the US. 
These experiences intimate that actually, some of these jurisdictions – awestruck by the 
accomplishments of the US – have not developed the enforcement culture necessary to 
effectively implement and maintain a criminalised antitrust regime. ‘[W]ithout broad-ranging 
acceptance and support domestically, the rhetoric of regulators in local and international fora 
may not be sufficient to secure the effective enforcement of criminal provisions.18 Therefore, 
jurisdictions contemplating criminalisation must be prepared to engage in a process that creates 
and fosters an enforcement culture. Indeed, a ‘major part of the [US] story is the belief, shared 
                                                 
12 Joel Davidow, ‘Recent US Antitrust Developments of International Relevance’ (2004) 27 World Competition 
407, 409. 
13 DOJ Antitrust Division, ‘Workload Statistics FY 2004-2013’ <http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/workload-
statistics.html> accessed 12 June 2014. 
14 Donald Baker, ‘Deterring Cartels – the Criminalization Dimension’ (Competition Law Enforcement Seminar, 
Dublin, 23 March 2012) 11. 
15  Christopher Harding, ‘Business Collusion as a Criminological Phenomenon: Exploring the Global 
Criminalisation of Business Cartels’ (2006) 14 Critical Criminology 181, 192-194. 
16 Enterprise Act 2002, s 190(1). 
17 R v Whittle & Others [2008] EWCA Crim 2560. 
18 Caron Beaton-Wells, ‘Criminalising Cartels: Australia’s Slow Conversion’ (2008) 31 World Competition 205, 
206. 
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by the enforcers and much of the public, that highly visible jail sentences are the most effective 
way to deter cartel activities’.19 
On these foregoing points, this paper argues that criminal sanctions work in the US 
largely due to an enforcement culture that politically and publicly recognises the negative 
influence of cartels, recognises the efficacy of criminal sanctions to effectively deter and punish 
this activity, and uses specific investigatory and procedural processes – all of which can be 
regarded as “peculiarly American”.20 It will be concluded that other countries, seeking to 
emulate the US, must realise that success will not be derived overnight: it will be the product 
of pragmatic efforts to persuade key stakeholders of criminal antitrust enforcement’s value and 
effectiveness. 
First, the general rationale for criminalisation will be explained – specifically, the 
inadequacy of fines, the issue of ‘agency’, and the fear that consumers may actually suffer from 
the imposition of corporate fines. Second, the particularities of the American antitrust regime 
will be detailed, revealing the predominant reasons for its accomplishments. Third, and 
building on this latter section, reference will be made to the UK, using it as an example to 
demonstrate the consequences that follow from not building an enforcement culture. The UK’s 
lethargic efforts before, during, and after the criminal cartel offence was created, failed to 
generate the support of key stakeholders that is necessary for a successful criminalised antitrust 
regime. Fourth, it will be explained why the support of key stakeholders – such as the judiciary, 
general public, and government – is necessary. Following this, with reference to Australia, this 
paper will put forward a rhetorical framework that other countries may draw upon when 
attempting to garner both public and political support in the criminalisation process. It will be 
argued that because of the global financial crisis leaving many countries in dire straits, 
regulators must seize this opportunity to leverage the concepts of inequality and financial 
hardship in demonstrating the pernicious nature of cartels and, as a result, highlight why the 
case for criminalisation is so strong. They must take steps ‘to create, in part through the process 
of criminalisation itself, a strong sense of the unacceptability of the conduct in question, within 
the industry in question, and beyond’.21 
 
                                                 
19 Donald Baker, ‘Punishment for Cartel Participants in the US: A Special Model?’ in Caron Beaton-Wells and 
Ariel Ezrachi (eds), Criminalising Cartels: Critical Studies of an International Regulatory Movement (Hart 
Publishing 2011) ch 2. 
20 ibid. 
21 Law Commission Consultation Report 195, Criminal Liability in Regulatory Contexts: A Consultation Paper 
(2010). 
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B. WHY CRIMINALISATION? 
Deterrence is the primary rationale for criminalising antitrust infringements. At its most basic, 
and as stated at this paper’s outset, individuals instigate cartel activity.22 It has therefore been 
argued that corporate fines alone are inappropriate because they fail to target the individuals 
responsible. 23  Drawing on corporate governance literature relating to agency theory, the 
following paragraphs will show why individuals’ incentives may not be aligned with the 
company’s, thereby increasing their proclivity (especially in an economic recession) to initiate 
a cartel without any concern for the consequences. The inadequacy of corporate fines will also 
be evinced, showing that they would have to be impossibly high to ensure deterrence. It will 
ultimately be concluded that because it is individuals who instigate price-fixing, it makes sense 
to concentrate deterrence on those who actually engage in the prohibited behaviour.24 
Individuals fix prices, not companies:  
As agents of corporations commit violations of competition law, it makes sense to 
prevent them from engaging in unlawful conduct by threatening them directly with 
sanctions and to impose such sanctions if they violate the law.25  
Indeed, Baker notes from his experience that those who engage in cartel activity are ‘generally 
ambitious individuals seeking promotion, reputation enhancement, bonuses, or other indirect 
gains from appearing to have been more successful commercially than they really were’.26 This 
is also the experience of Calvani and Calvani, ie it is usually middle-management who engage 
in this behaviour.27 
Company officers and employees are agents of corporations. Agency is ‘a contract 
under which one or more persons (the principal(s)) engage another person (the agent) to 
perform some service on their behalf which involves delegating some decision making 
authority to the agent’. 28  A typical example is the relationship between shareholder and 
director. The main dilemma stemming from such relationships is that the principal and agent, 
whilst ostensibly working towards the same object, may not share corresponding interests. 
Therefore, ‘[i]n most agency relationships … there will be some divergence between the 
                                                 
22 Baker, ‘Deterring Cartels – the Criminalization Dimension’ (n 14). 
23 Wouter Wills, ‘Is Criminalization of EU Competition Law the Answer?’ (Amsterdam Centre for Law and 
Economics Conference: Remedies and Sanctions in Competition Policy, Amsterdam, 17-18 February 2005). 
24 Calvani and Calvani, ‘Criminal Sanctions for Cartel Offences: An Appropriate Sanction in Australia’ (2009) 
17 Competition & Consumer Law Journal 119, 127-128. 
25 OECD, Cartel Sanctions Against Individuals (DAF/COMP(2004)39 2005) 16. (emphases added) 
26 Baker, ‘Punishment for Cartel Participants in the US: A Special Model?’ (n 19). 
27 Calvani and Calvani (n 24) 127. 
28  Michael Jensen and William Meckling, ‘Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and 
Ownership Structure’ (1976) 3(4) Journal of Financial Economics 5. 
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agent’s decisions and those decisions which would maximize the welfare of the principal.29 
The principal’s problem is incentivising the agent to satisfy the principal’s objectives; the 
agent’s problem is that situations may arise where the agent can act in the principal’s interest, 
the agent’s own interest, or some compromise between the two when these interests are 
incongruent and possibly competing.30 
Jensen and Meckling explain this by contrasting management behaviours in two 
different scenarios: where the manager owns 100 percent of the company, and where the 
manager sells equity to outside investors.31 In the former scenario, the agency problem does 
not exist because the owner-manager will endeavour to maximise company welfare – the whole 
benefit accumulating only to him. Maximisation occurs when the marginal utility of each spent 
dollar equals the non-monetary benefits (eg employee respect, workforce size) and the marginal 
utility of each after-tax dollar. However, if the owner-manager sells 30 percent of the company, 
agency costs emerge due to the disparity of interests between the manager and new 
shareholders. Here, the owner-manager’s wealth reduces to 70 percent. His proclivity to expend 
resources will be such that one dollar used equals the marginal utility of 70 cents of spending 
power, ie a reduction equal to the wealth share reduction. 
Agency costs might include the greater need of outside shareholders to monitor the 
owner-manager’s behaviour.32 Other costs are more serious, like the agent’s reluctance to seek 
out new business ventures. Actually, he might avoid these altogether simply because it would 
require too much effort. For example, he may have to work harder to learn new technologies, 
or hire special consultants resulting in lengthy selection and appointment processes. In 
attempting to avoid such personal hardships, company value is undermined, decreasing it to a 
lower level than it otherwise could have been. In the end, the agent might simply decide that it 
would be easier to raise company performance (and thereby the agent’s own reputation) by 
initiating a price-fixing cartel with other competitors, than by any of the traditional methods.  
Indeed, anecdotal evidence by Baker suggests that managers who act on such impulses 
are generally apathetic to the consequences for the company, and ‘never seem to have worried 
particularly about the corporate shareholders being socked with large fines … Rather, to the 
extent that they have worried, their concern was about being exposed and punished 
                                                 
29 ibid. 
30 Barry Mitnick, ‘Fiduciary Rationality and Public Policy: The Theory of Agency and Some Consequences’ 
(1973 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, New Orleans, Louisina, September 1973) 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1020859> accessed 11 August 2014. 
31 Jensen and Meckling (n 28) 10-11. 
32 ibid 12. 
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themselves’. 33  Furthermore, the risk of collusion between companies is exacerbated in a 
recession. Employees are under pressure to perform at a level that is more difficult in the 
current financial climate and, as a result, they may decide that it would be easier to achieve 
performance targets through a cartel than it would be through conventional means. This risk is 
compounded by the fact that in a recession, managers and in-house counsel may not be able to 
afford as much time and resources towards developing compliance programs and emphasising 
their importance to subordinate employees.34 On this analysis, therefore, corporate fines may 
not be adequate because it is the company’s individuals who make the decisions and as such 
commit the crimes. In contrast, ‘[b]y targeting the actual decision-maker, competition 
authorities could bypass ineffective corporate governance mechanisms of compliance and 
indirect punishment’.35 
Another reason why corporate fines are inadequate is that they would have to be 
unfeasibly high to ensure deterrence.36. Theoretically, fines should be preferred over custodial 
sentences, as they impose less of a cost on society. However, effective deterrence requires that 
a prospective cartelist perceive the expected costs of price fixing to outweigh the potential 
benefit. 
The benefit is the over-charge of the product, yet expunging this would still not achieve 
optimal deterrence because only a fraction of cartels are detected. As such, the fine would 
therefore have to be increased to take account of the probability (or more aptly the 
improbability) of detection. Two investigators explored this issue in the US. They found that 
only 13-17 percent of price-fixers were ultimately prosecuted successfully.37 
Even with an increase, however, corporate fines would still have to be impossibly high. 
For instance, Wouter Wills maintains that fines would have to be somewhere around 150 
percent of annual turnover to ensure deterrence.38 This is impractical for a number of reasons. 
First, it would be unacceptable in the EU because of the statutory ceiling of 10 percent under 
                                                 
33 Baker, ‘Punishment for Cartel Participants in the US: A Special Model?’ (n 19). 
34 Janet McDavid and Megan Dixon, ‘Criminal Antitrust Enforcement in a Down Economy’ (Lexology, 28 May 
2009) <http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=8bd04582-1700-478b-9022-6a97c74a0d46> accessed 9 
August 2014. 
35 Katalin Cseres, Maarten Schinkel, and Floris Vogelaar, ‘Law & Economics of Criminal Antitrust Enforcement: 
An Introduction’ in Katalin Cseres, Maarten Schinkel, and Floris Vogelaar (eds) Criminalisation of Competition 
Law Enforcement: Economic and Legal Implications for the EU Member States (Edward Elgar Publishing 2006) 
7-8. 
36 Calvani and Calvani (n 24) 128. 
37 ibid citing Peter Bryant and E Woodrow Eckard, ‘Price-fixing: The Probability of Getting Caught’ (1991) 73 
Review of Economics and Statistics 531. 
38  Wouter Wills, ‘Does the Effective Enforcement of Articles 81 and 82 EC Require Not Only Fines On 
Undertakings But Also Individual Penalties, In Particular Imprisonment?’ (Competition Law and Policy 
Workshop at the European University Institute, Florence, 1-2 June 2001). 
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Article 23(2) Regulation 1/2003.39 Second, and more generally, high fines might exceed an 
undertaking’s ability to pay, resulting in not just sub-optimal enforcement due to incomplete 
deterrence, but also costly side effects like company bankruptcy and, consequently, undesirable 
social consequences like job losses or strains on a country’s exchequer. Third, and 
paradoxically from a competition law perspective, the company, if it survived the fine, might 
decide to offset the cost by passing it on to consumers in the form of higher prices. And if firms 
did go bankrupt, this might lead to greater market concentration – another (generally) 
undesirable outcome from a competition law perspective. Indeed, one study suggests that sixty 
percent of firms would be unable to meet the demand of high fines without incurring 
bankruptcy.40 
UK Independent Schools aptly illustrates this particular defect of corporate fines.41 The 
Office of Fair Trading (OFT) found that information exchanges regarding fees between 50 fee-
paying independent schools constituted a Chapter 1 infringement. However, the schools were 
ultimately made to pay a £3 million ex gratia payment to a trust, which would benefit those 
who attended the schools during the infringement period. In return, the fine imposed was 
substantially reduced for each school. This was sensible because a heavy fine may have led to 
an increase in tuition fees, which would only have served to further harm students. 
There is another, peripheral rationale for cartel criminalisation. It has the ability to 
enhance a competition authority’s corporate leniency programme – an enforcement tool that 
will now be examined in the broader context of the US. 
 
C. WHY HAS CRIMINALISATION BEEN SO SUCCESSFUL IN THE UNITED 
STATES? 
Sherman Act violations have traditionally been punishable with criminal fines for companies 
and individuals, and imprisonment also for the latter.42 Whilst the original Sherman Act in 1890 
encompassed these penalties, it was not until about 70 years later that jail time for perpetrators 
would begin to become commonplace.43 The following paragraphs will show that the process 
                                                 
39 Council Regulation (EC) 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid 
down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty [2003] OJ L1/1. 
40 Joseph Gallo, Joseph Craycraft, and Catherine Craycraft, ‘Antitrust Sanctions and a Firm’s ability to Pay’ 
(1997) 12 Review of Industrial Organisation 171. 
41 OFT Decision CA98/05/2006. 
42 Sherman Act, 26 Stat 209 (1890), 15 USC ss 1-7. 
43 Keith Jones and Farin Harrison, ‘Criminal Sanctions: An Overview of EU and National Case Law’ (Baker & 
McKenzie, 25 March 2014) <http://www.bakermckenzie.com/ARAPCriminalSanctionsMar14/> accessed 15 July 
2014. 
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was indeed gradual, progressive, and incremental, distinguished by ‘cultural assumptions and 
political traditions [that] have been so important in shaping the process’.44 US enforcement 
authorities have also benefited from several distinct investigatory and procedural tools: 
interrelated corporate and individual leniency programmes; a combined civil and criminal 
enforcement entity; and grand jury trials. This section will conclude that other jurisdictions 
considering criminal enforcement may be hard set to find substantive guidance from the US, 
as ‘it clearly rests on cultural assumptions and its legal institutions which may not be repeated 
elsewhere’.45 
The original Sherman Act statute made antitrust violations misdemeanours and 
imposed a maximum jail time of one year and a maximum fine of $5,000. The Act came about 
because of populist outrage, ‘rather than being the product of careful study by some learned 
commission’.46 As a consequence, antitrust has always had a strong moral dimension in the 
US. As Robert Reich commented in 1980, ‘antitrust is popular with the public’ and ‘the ideal 
of competition [continues] to receive broad support from a wide spectrum of American public 
opinion’.47 Similarly, as Baker has explained, price-fixing is viewed as immoral, like theft.48 
These original Sherman Act sanctions remained in place all the way up until 1974, when the 
Act was amended so that violations of its provisions became felonies. 49  Corporate fines 
increased and individuals found guilty of violating the legislation could now be imprisoned for 
3 years. 
In 1987, the Sentencing Guidelines 50  resolved the quandary judges had with 
imprisoning what they saw as ‘nice people’.51 Many federal judges were reluctant to sentence 
price-fixers, as they were often prominent public figures in their communities who contributed 
to churches and charities. Moreover, once price-fixers were apprehended they tended to show 
remorse and were perceived as showing no physical threat to other members of society.52 The 
Sentencing Guidelines made prison the immediate remedy, however. They were mandatory 
until United States v Booker, 53 which ruled that such mandatory use was unconstitutional. By 
                                                 
44 Baker, ‘Punishment for Cartel Participants in the US: A Special Model?’ (n 19). 
45 Baker, ‘Deterring Cartels – the Criminalization Dimension’ (n 14) 1. 
46 ibid 3. 
47 Robert Reich, ‘The Antitrust Industry’ (1980) 68 Georgetown Law Journal 1035, 1054. 
48 Donald Baker, ‘The Use of Criminal Law Remedies to Deter and Punish Cartels and Bid-Rigging (2001) 69 
George Washington Law Review 693, 714; Baker, ‘Deterring Cartels – the Criminalization Dimension’ (n 14). 
49 Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act, 88 Stat 1706 (1974), Public Law 93-528, s 3(1). 
50 US Sentencing Commission, ‘Sentencing Guidelines and Policy Statements’ (1987). 
51 Baker, ‘Punishment for Cartel Participants in the US: A Special Model?’ (n 19). 
52 ibid. 
53 543 US 220 (2005). 
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this time it was too late, though: the Guidelines had already generated a norm such that taking 
away their formal compulsory use did not change the fact that judges would continue to opt to 
use them anyway, as they had done for so long. As one criminal antitrust defence lawyer 
explained, ‘[b]ecause of the sentencing Guidelines and the unwavering determination of the 
Antitrust Division, the US antitrust defendant almost always understands that the question is 
not whether he will go to prison, but for how long’.54 Finally, in 2004, the maximum corporate 
and individual fines for violations of the Sherman Act rose to $100 million and $1 million 
respectively; the maximum jail term was increased to 10 years. 
In light of these developments, other jurisdictions contemplating criminal antitrust 
enforcement should not expect immediate results. By using ‘gentle nudges’ instead of ‘hard 
shoves’, the US avoided what Kahan terms ‘sticky norms’.55 It was a step-by-step process, with 
the severity of the penalty increasing gradually. However, as previously mentioned, 
criminalisation in the US was a bottom-up process anyway, and so it is arguable that a norm 
did not really exist to the effect that price-fixing should not be subject to criminal sanctions. In 
any event, the US, albeit inadvertently, made sure that any such norm did not come into play, 
as the law slowly but surely condemned price-fixing. As Kahan contends:  
If the law condemns [price-fixing] substantially more than does the typical [judge, jury, 
or enforcement official, their] personal aversion to condemning too severely will 
dominate [their] inclination to enforce the law, and [they] will balk. … If, however, the 
law condemns the behaviour only slightly more than does the typical [judge, jury, or 
enforcement official, their] desire to discharge [their] civic duties will override [their] 
reluctance to condemn, and [they] will enforce the law.56 
Other jurisdictions considering criminalising antitrust offences – the majority of which will 
almost certainly be a top-down process – should take heed of this subtle lesson. 
The US success is also based on a number of unique investigatory and procedural tools. 
Under the Corporate Amnesty Programme,57 the US Department of Justice (DOJ) guarantees 
to afford all the officers, employees, and agents of the ‘first in’ amnesty applicant company 
immunity from prosecution. Specifically in the US, however, there is an even greater incentive 
for the company to come forward: even if a CEO was not heavily involved in the cartel activity, 
                                                 
54 Donald Klawiter and Jennifer Driscoll, ‘Sentencing Individuals in Antitrust Cases: The Proper Balance’ (2009) 
23(2) Antitrust Magazine 75, 77. 
55 Dan Kahan, ‘Gentle Nudges vs Hard Shoves: Solving The Sticky Norms Problem’ (2000) 67 U Chi L Rev 607. 
56 ibid 608. 
57 US Department of Justice, ‘Corporate Leniency Policy’ 
<http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/0091.htm> accessed 3 July 2014. 
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a more involved subordinate employee may be able to obtain immunity – under the individual 
leniency programme58 – in exchange for a promise of testimony that the CEO and/or more 
senior executives had knowledge of, or had approved, the infringement. Therefore, if a 
company does not report unlawful conduct itself, an employee may come forward of their own 
accord and report the company’s activities to protect himself or herself. As Scott Hammond 
explains in the context of DOJ’s combining of corporate and individual leniency programmes:  
The real value … of the Individual Leniency Programme is not in the number of 
individual applications we receive, but in the number of corporate applications it 
generates. It works because it acts as a watchdog to ensure that companies report the 
conduct themselves … So long as one of its employees has individual exposure, the 
company remains at great risk.59 
Efforts to criminalise antitrust offences elsewhere may be further hampered because of 
institutional makeup. Jurisdictions in Europe, for example, have an institutional heritage of 
applying administrative fines through administrative agencies against businesses, as opposed 
to criminal sanctions against individuals. Furthermore, a separate institution from cartel 
enforcement currently oversees criminal law enforcement, which would not be conducive to a 
successful criminalised antitrust regime. For instance, prosecutors may not prioritise antitrust 
cases ahead of rape and murder, or may be deterred by their unfamiliarity with antitrust more 
generally.60 
In comparison, the US entrusts both civil and criminal enforcement of cartels to a 
specialist division within DOJ. In addition to avoiding the above pitfalls, this hybrid 
enforcement entity is better suited to running a successful leniency programme. This is because 
if enforcement were separated, neither institution might be able to accurately reassure potential 
leniency applicants. Indeed, Scott Hammond lists transparency and predictability as to how a 
company will be dealt with should it apply for leniency as cornerstones of an effective leniency 
programme.61 Kovacic also maintains that ‘[i]f there is any non-trivial doubt about the certainty 
of the government’s commitment to abate the criminal sanctions, firms are likely to decline to 
report the misconduct’. 62  It is worth noting that a solution to this asymmetry between 
                                                 
58 US Departmentt of Justice, ‘Individual Leniency Policy’ 
<http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/0092.htm> accessed 3 July 2014. 
59  Scott Hammond, ‘Cornerstones of an Effective Leniency Programme’ (ICN Workshop on Leniency 
Programmes, Sydney, Australia, 22-23 November 2004) 11, 12. 
60 Shaffer, Nesbitt, and Waller (n 7) 27. 
61 Hammond, ‘Cornerstones of an Effective Leniency Program’ (n 59). 
62 William E Kovacic, ‘Criminal Enforcement Norms in Competition Policy: Insights from US Experience’ in 
Beaton-Wells and Ezrachi (n 19) ch 3. 
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prosecutorial bodies and administrative competition authorities would be to stipulate within the 
law itself that competition authority decisions made with respect to leniency automatically bind 
the public prosecutor.63 In any case, for leniency to work, there must of course exist a credible 
threat of detection and punishment of the cartel (‘heightened fear of detection’),64 which is all 
the more possible with a well-resourced and dedicated body in charge of both investigating and 
prosecuting antitrust cases. 
Finally, the grand jury system is another distinguishing aspect of US antitrust 
enforcement.65 It allows DOJ to build a credible criminal cartel case even when documentary 
evidence is limited.66 It is enshrined in the Fifth Amendment that felony offences cannot be 
tried except on indictment by a grand jury. The grand jury decides not the guilt or innocence 
of a person, but whether enough evidence exists to bring a case to trial. Grand juries hear 
evidence presented by the prosecutor and utilise subpoenas to collect this evidence. It can 
subpoena documents, physical evidence, and witnesses to testify.67 As stated in United States 
v Calandra: ‘The grand jury may compel the production of evidence or the testimony of 
witnesses as it considers appropriate…’68 No judge is present, and counsel for the defence is 
not allowed to be in the grand jury room during proceedings. 
For DOJ, then, bringing a case to a grand jury affords an opportunity to exploit its 
powers to help the investigation. Indeed, Sherman Act investigations can be very lengthy and 
complex and the evidence that is ultimately collected may not be enough for proof of guilt 
beyond reasonable doubt. With the grand jury, prosecutors can play individual targets against 
each other, as only DOJ knows exactly what information they themselves have and where it 
originated, and what information they still require to make or strengthen a case. DOJ can also 
offer immunity to targets for information on bigger targets.69 Moreover, just because a person 
was not indicted by a grand jury does not mean that they cannot be tried again: the principle of 
‘double jeopardy’ would not apply, as they had not yet actually been tried.70  
In conclusion, it is clear that America’s approach to punishing cartels has been an 
evolutionary process, one grounded upon ‘politics and public psychologies that others may 
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regard as peculiarly American’.71 Amongst the unique procedural and investigatory tools at its 
disposal, perhaps the most defining feature of the US antitrust system is that all relevant 
stakeholders – politicians, judges, and the American public – agree that sending cartel 
participants to jail is the best way to achieve deterrence, ie prevent future violations of antitrust 
law. Public outcry and populist-driven frustrations engendered key political support for the 
formulation and implementation of antitrust law in the US at critical times (a bottom-up 
process). The Sherman and Clayton Acts were national landmarks ‘created on the basis of 
populist outrage at the perceived abuses of Standard Oil and other high visibility villains’.72 
DOJ was not involved and did not push the earlier political movements. It did not recommend 
the 1974 and 2004 milestones nor did it publicly voice support for these changes. The process 
was also gradual, and ‘[it] has taken almost a century in the US for incarceration to become 
routine for cartel participants who are caught’.73 
If other governments do decide to criminalise their national antitrust laws (a top-down 
process), they must make efforts to obtain the necessary stakeholder support for such a regime. 
As Shaffer and others note, ‘[n]ot all publics are convinced that cartel offenses merit the 
criminal penalty of jail time’.74 This is an issue in Europe, and it was particularly exemplified 
in the UK by its naivety towards creating and enforcing a criminal cartel offence. 
 
D. EUROPE AND THE UNITED KINGDOM 
The European Commission can only impose fines on undertakings which ‘shall not be of a 
criminal nature’ according to Article 23 (5) Regulation 1/2003. As Baker explains in the 
European context:  
[C]artels [continue] to be viewed by the public and the politicians as a ‘regulatory’ 
problem subject to regulatory remedies … Thus there does not yet seem to be the kind 
of broad basis of political support (or acceptance) that is probably necessary to generate 
support for criminalization on any broad scale in Europe.75  
Harding also notes that at least outside of North America, the public appears to lack inherently 
criminal feelings towards price-fixing and similar practices.76 
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The significance of public and political attitudes towards specific types of behaviour 
can be analysed in light of the UK’s attempt to create a criminal cartel offence. However, in 
contrast to the ‘groundswell of concern’ towards cartel activity in the US (a bottom-up process), 
the UK’s move towards criminalisation was motivated by ‘regulatory interests seeking to 
strengthen the regulatory armoury against cartels, [thereby creating] greater awareness and 
concern regarding cartel conduct than currently exists (a top-down process)’.77 The collapse of 
the first contested jury trial – British Airways78 – on 10 May 2010,79 under the UK’s uninspiring 
criminal cartel regime, was the nadir of eight years of embarrassment for the OFT.80 Indeed, it 
has now been over a decade since the enactment of the highly rated criminal cartel offence and 
prosecutors have yet to obtain a single ‘guilty’ jury verdict; convictions have only been 
obtained through guilty pleas – in Marine Hose81 and most recently Galvanised Steel Tanks.82 
The UK government’s objective was to construct ‘a world class competition regime for 
the UK’.83 However, the following paragraphs will argue that the hollow rhetoric employed by 
enforcement officials and politicians did little to amass the necessary support from key 
stakeholders. The seriousness of cartels was not sufficiently relayed to enforcement officials, 
resulting in a flippant attitude towards prosecuting individuals. In particular, three factors will 
be critically assessed: the unpersuasive and dispassionate rhetoric of enforcement officials and 
criminalisation advocates; the carelessness in the handling of cases; and the inappropriate 
requirement of ‘dishonesty’ in the cartel statute’s language. 
First, with respect to unpersuasive rhetoric, the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) 
began its campaign for criminalisation with a half-hearted mindset. Its intention was merely 
for criminal sanctions to be used alongside civil enforcement to bolster the administrative 
regime under section 2 Competition Act 1998. Individuals would be subject to criminal charges 
only in the most serious cases, with the majority being dealt with under the administrative 
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regime.84 Such intentions did not resemble the fervent attitudes of DOJ and its serious stance 
on cartel activity. The following statement illustrates this difference: 
The point is not how many individuals we send to prison … We would rather that people 
did not end up operating cartels, but it is important if they do that we will have to send 
a message, both to the individual and society, that it is unacceptable and a serious 
offence.85 
Signs of optimism resurfaced after Marine Hose86 – constituting the first convictions obtained 
by the OFT for cartel activity – but there was little indication of solid, substantive commitment 
to criminalisation: ‘Watch this space. We have criminal enforcement high on the agenda … 
We’re working hard and doing a lot’.87 
In May 2002, the then Director of Competition Enforcement at the OFT naively stated:  
[a]re these new powers necessary? Will they be used? The short answer to both 
questions is ‘yes’ … [Serious cartel] activity is equivalent to theft. It has no redeeming 
features. However we will carefully select the cartels for criminal prosecutions, 
concentrating on the most serious ones. We expect there will be a relatively small 
number of prosecutions – but they will have a significant deterrent effect. The first 
prosecutions will reach the courts in a few years.88 
Finally, the OFT Annual Plan for 2008-09 professed: ‘We will continue to root out hard 
core cartel activity across the whole economy. We are committed to using our criminal powers 
where appropriate’.89 
The above statements were unconvincing not only as to how committed top 
enforcement officials really were, but also as to the frequency with which the new sanctions 
would be used. In comparison, DOJ statistics at this paper’s outset are not indicators of 
lessening deterrence; instead, sentences are simply becoming more frequent and harsher. 
Moreover, the statements were predicated on a belief that criminalisation was actually 
desirable. They do not exactly inspire confidence and are a far cry from the rhetoric of US 
officials, which signalled commitment, passion, motivation, and desire. To compound this 
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lethargy, the UK cartel offence’s profile (an awareness that it actually existed) was virtually 
invisible until British Airways.90 In essence, no effort was made to create and nurture an 
enforcement culture. Consequently, strong commitment and support from key stakeholders was 
not obtained. 
Second, the incompetence of the OFT to deal with criminal cartel cases Illustrates this 
latter point – specifically, the collapse of the British Airways91 case. The offence related to the 
fixing of fuel surcharges on transatlantic passenger routes with Virgin Airlines; Virgin applied 
for corporate leniency and blew the whistle on British Airways. The case was regarded as the 
first real test of the criminal cartel offence, but the case collapsed due to a simple evidential 
disclosure error. Thousands of emails were not disclosed to British Airways, including 12,000 
emails by a key prosecution witness, Paul Moore, Virgin Atlantic’s former corporate affairs 
chief. In addition, the important task of document disclosure was delegated to the in-house 
counsel of Virgin and their external lawyers – the other party to the cartel and also the 
whistleblower. One might question, then, whether the OFT had adequate resources to collect 
the evidence in the first place. If not, then this may have been a direct consequence of not 
fostering stakeholder support during the criminalisation process – in particular, support from 
government, which ultimately determines a regulator’s funding. The DTI’s dubious 
commitment to criminalisation also lends itself to this contention. 
Third and finally, the ‘dishonesty’ requirement in section 188 of the Enterprise Act 
2002 has been heavily criticised and held to be one of the main reasons for the offence’s failure, 
with the Hammond/Penrose Report acknowledging ‘the approach of “dishonesty” may be 
difficult for juries to understand’.92 This was particularly exemplified by Norris v United 
States,93 where price-fixing was held not to be dishonest in the absence of other discernible 
factors, for example fraud. The case concerned a CEO of the company Morgan Crucible who 
had been indicted by a US court in 2003 for fixing the prices of carbon products. DOJ 
commenced extradition proceedings to have the CEO extradited from the UK. The case 
demonstrated how the seriousness of the cartel offence was not yet reflected in judicial attitudes 
and public opinion.94 Indeed, as previously stated, criminalisation in the UK did not stem from 
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public outcry and a bottom-up, backward-looking process. Rather, it was motivated by a 
forward-looking, top-down approach, sparked by international consensus calling for greater 
deterrents to cartels.95 
Yet in ascertaining the applicability of criminal law to cartels, one must distinguish 
criminal law from civil law, and whether there is something special about criminal law that 
requires its separation from civil law more generally.96 For example, Lamond argues that as 
‘part of the value of criminal law lies in its constituting the most serious form of censure and 
condemnation open to a community – in singling out certain conduct for this treatment’, the 
relationship between the legal and lay concept of crime is ‘symbiotic’.97 Essentially, criminal 
law’s inherent ability to express severe disapproval of certain conduct in a community results 
in an interaction between ordinary people’s conception of crime and the corresponding legal 
concept. 
However, the criminal cartel offence is a stark example of criminal law being stretched 
beyond a body of law that stems from, and pre-assumes, moral delinquency.98 The UK cartel 
offence sought to expand criminal law into an area where there is no presupposition that the 
area it is venturing into is morally condemned. As the Court commented in Norris when 
rejecting an argument that public perceptions towards cartels had changed, it was ‘impossible 
to find any contemporaneous observations to support the argument’.99 Julian Joshua even 
maintains that the UK public have ‘traditionally been tolerant of, if not positively welcoming’ 
of cartels.100 Furthermore, Andreas Stephan’s survey indicated in 2008 that even after the 
offence’s introduction, attitudes remained weak and a consensus did not exist that price-fixing 
was morally wrong.101 
On this analysis, it could be argued that in deciding to criminalise certain conduct, 
lawmakers should not deviate too far from the type of behaviour that is generally regarded as 
being reprehensible or deserving of stigma – yet this is exactly what the UK did. The 
‘dishonesty’ element in the criminal cartel offence arguably would have failed had it been put 
before a jury because it could not signal moral stigma – something that it relies upon and pre-
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supposes in order to function. The UK Cartel offence presumed moral censure existed when in 
fact none did, and as Williams explains, ‘the law cannot pull itself up by its own bootstraps in 
this way’.102 
Furthermore, the government has arguably failed to address this in its new reform of 
the cartel offence through the Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act (ERRA) 2013. 103 
Removing the ‘dishonesty’ requirement may make convictions more straightforward, but it 
will not guarantee that censure will follow convictions or, more significantly, that judges will 
imprison those convicted. For instance, the new offence contains no mens rea requirement, 
compared to the US where criminal intent is required for Sherman Act violations in criminal 
prosecutions. Also, it could be argued that the strongest reason for criminalising cartels is that 
they are ‘naked’: they cannot be justified on efficiency grounds and can inflict serious 
economic harm. The legislation, however, does not reference these factors – factors which 
should arguably be made clear if an anti-cartel culture is to grow to the point where it is natural 
to view cartels as serious criminal activity.104 
As the remainder of this paper will show, however, attitudes towards a specific type of 
behaviour can be shaped. It is clear that public support for a regime is important, mainly 
because juries are selected from the public. But it is also important in a further respect: to 
generate governmental support, which will in turn influence (or enhance if they already exist) 
the powers afforded to enforcement agencies/regulators. Indeed, past experience has shown 
that a regulator may be susceptible to attack from business interest groups if it does not have 
solid political backing. 105  Political support is also necessary to ensure that other relevant 
agencies – prosecutors and the judiciary – are afforded powers to enforce the new regime.106 It 
is on these issues that we turn to examine the significance of creating and fostering an 
enforcement culture when deciding to criminalise cartels. 
 
E. THE IMPORTANCE OF AN ENFORCEMENT CULTURE 
In the framing of a legal system, the most important decision is the choice of sanctions to 
remedy infringements of law. This is because the choice of sanctions (eg injunctions; damages; 
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incarceration; director disqualification; or a mix of these) is ‘fundamental to the formal 
calculations and informal intuition that determine whether corporate entities and natural 
persons will obey the law’.107 As the foregoing discussions have shown, antitrust law is at the 
centre of such debates, ie whether antitrust infringements should be subject to criminal 
sanctions. It is generally argued that only cartels should be subject to criminal sanctions, they 
being the most clear-cut and severe form of anticompetitive conduct.108 The following sections 
are to be held as consistent with this view. 
A jurisdiction considering the use of criminal sanctions faces institutional challenges. 
Without domestic support, criminal sanctions may not have the desired effect ‘to change 
business norms and behaviour so as to reduce significantly the incidence of serious cartel 
conduct’.109 Therefore, support from a variety of key stakeholders (including the regulator, 
government, general public, and judiciary) will be necessary for the success of 
criminalisation.110 Specifically, a competition policy system that utilises criminal sanctions 
must: i) develop a culture within enforcement agencies that encourages employees to treat 
certain acts as very serious offences and perceive them as deserving of aggressive investigation, 
ii) persuade external stakeholders (eg legislators and general public) that certain antitrust 
infringements deserve to be punished by criminal sanctions, and iii) convince courts and juries 
that infringers should be convicted and severely punished.111 The following paragraphs will 
explain why the support of each of these stakeholders is paramount. Following this, drawing 
on experience from the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC), a 
rhetorical strategy will be put forward that can be used by regulators to attain the requisite 
support from two of the most important stakeholders: general public and government. 
Regulator support is evidently vital for the success of criminal cartel enforcement.112 
This will especially be the case if, as in Australia for example, the regulator is regarded as 
having political power and can therefore influence other stakeholders’ perceptions about the 
criminalisation of antitrust infringements. Indeed, some stakeholders may not be entirely 
convinced of the justification for criminalisation and, as a result, the regulator must raise 
awareness about the evils of cartels to these constituents.113 Furthermore, the regulator must 
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actually use its newfound powers. As shown by the experience of the US, in order for the threat 
of imprisonment to be credible, there must be a realistic threat of detection and punishment, 
which is all the more probable if there exists a well-resourced and dedicated body in charge of 
investigating and prosecuting antitrust offences. The degree to which it can do this, however, 
will largely depend on its level of funding, which will of course rest upon the support level of 
another stakeholder: government. 
Governmental support is plainly necessary to get the legislation enacted. 114 In addition, 
regulators and courts must be afforded powers and resources that will enable them to enforce 
the new law – another derivative of governmental support. Just like regulator support, however, 
governmental support is also dependent upon the backing of another stakeholder: the general 
public. Public support is one of the biggest – if not the biggest – determinants of success for a 
criminal cartel offence. The US experience illustrates this contention by its bottom-up impetus, 
which propelled the use of criminal sanctions against cartels. Public support is significant in 
two respects: firstly, it is influential in generating political support for the regime which, as 
noted, determines the powers and funding afforded to other stakeholders (such as regulators). 
Secondly, juries are selected from the public, who are less likely to convict when enrolled to 
serve on a jury if they are oblivious to the seriousness of cartels.115 
The importance of judicial support is also pertinent in this regard. Judges and juries 
must be willing to convict. To enhance deterrence, it is not enough for a criminal offence to 
lay dormant in a statute; it must be visibly enforced. Indeed, studies have shown that the risk 
of punishment has a far greater impact on deterrence than the punishment’s severity.116 One 
obstacle, however, is that judges and juries may perceive corporate misconduct as not 
immediately threatening to an individual, as they would do for ordinary types of crime like 
rape or murder.117 The reluctance of judges to sentence has been an issue for Ireland, where 
courts have often suspended prison sentences for competition law infringements.118 In any 
event, support from the judiciary is particularly important in influencing the general public and 
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their attitudes towards cartels. As Coffee maintains, ‘the public learns what is criminal from 
what is punished, not vice versa’.119 
 
F. BUILDING AN ENFORCEMENT CULTURE 
It is clear that creating and enforcing a criminal cartel offence will be a complex undertaking. 
It will require efforts to generate awareness about the pernicious nature of cartels, along with 
support from a variety of key players who will be instrumental in the regime’s success. 
Criminalisation of certain behaviour can significantly impact the operation of a legal system 
and it is therefore necessary to ‘[put] a premium on understanding a jurisdiction’s existing legal 
and social norms and on developing an implementation programme that gains acceptance for 
criminal sanctions’.120 As Professor Andreas Reindl observes, criminalisation does not ‘occur 
in a legal vacuum’.121 Social and political amenability towards criminal sanctions will vary 
across countries, and it is this challenge that gives rise to important implications for how a 
jurisdiction should go about criminalising antitrust violations. 
In the aftermath of the global financial crisis, however, there exists a universal concept 
that countries across the globe have had to grapple with: inequality. Whilst debates about cartel 
activity have primarily focused on its nature and effects, less discussion has been afforded to 
critically analysing cartel criminalisation in the broader political sphere and from the general 
public’s perspective. This is despite the fact that cartel criminalisation represents a categorical 
shift in economic policymaking, ie ‘behaviour seen to damage the economy is now not merely 
illegal, but criminal’.122 Indeed, the credibility of this view has been strengthened because of 
the global financial crisis, with families in some jurisdictions having to decide between buying 
food and paying their mortgage,123 or incurring food poverty in general.124 
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Drawing on insights from Australia and the ACCC, the following paragraphs examine 
exactly how a regulator can persuade two key stakeholders – the general public and government 
– to be more receptive to the idea of punishing cartels with criminal sanctions. Three key pieces 
of rhetoric will be used: criminal sanctions as protecting the economy, criminal sanctions as 
policing big business, and criminal sanctions as promoting egalitarianism. All of these 
arguments, more or less, rely on the ever-growing and contentious issue of inequality, given 
that (as previously stated) almost every country is experiencing this issue to varying degrees.125 
It will be concluded that now is the time for regulators to make their case for cartel 
criminalisation. They must leverage both the financial hardships currently being experienced 
by consumers and their resentment towards the financial industry and overly paid CEOs, in 
order to garner public and political support for a criminal cartel offence. 
First, relying on criminalisation to protect the economy, many people are unaware of 
antitrust law in general, or that it protects the free market economy from which they benefit. 
Over the past several decades, as part of an extensive microeconomic reform programme, both 
Labour and Conservative governments in Australia have emphasised the benefits of 
competition. The reforms have included public service privatisation, trade liberalisation, and 
financial and labour deregulation. These have helped to advance economic prosperity, 
employment rates, income levels, and living standards.126 The inequality gap has also been 
somewhat reduced, with benefits flowing to both high and low income earners. 127  Social 
attitude surveys reveal public support for these reforms, with Australians also viewing 
international trade as conducive to providing better consumer products. 128  They also 
understand that living standards depend on a growing economy: they see the value in 
‘maintaining “a high level of economic growth”, and are proud of Australia’s economic 
achievements’.129 
Conversely, social research also shows that Australians are uncertain about how much 
or to what degree free markets and trade are likely to improve their quality of life. In addition, 
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it seems that concerns have arisen about the widening of the income gap130 – a reflection of 
similar concerns worldwide. For example, a 2014 IMF study noted the rising inequality in 
advanced countries and the falling inequality in developing countries over the past 50 years.131 
In light of these ambivalent public attitudes, it would make sense to communicate the 
values of competition when embarking on the process of criminalisation. This is exactly what 
Australia did. The ACCC chairman linked cartels to metaphors of disease and death, describing 
them as a ‘cancer on our economy’.132 Competition was portrayed as having the ability to 
safeguard the free market reforms discussed above – reforms which were essential to 
Australia’s economic welfare and prosperity. It was promulgated that by adopting a tough 
stance on cartels, free-market policies and the resulting economic prosperity would be 
protected ‘by regulating to deter anti-competitive conduct that [threatened] the creativity and 
efficiency of the market’.133 The economic benefits of competition were especially emphasised 
in almost all public statements made by the ACCC and Parliament in support of criminalisation 
reform.134 As the Minister for Competition Policy and Consumer Affairs stated at the time of 
introducing the criminalisation Bill to Parliament, 
Competition is the primary means of ensuring that consumers get the best product or 
service for the lowest price possible. … Cartel conduct harms consumers, businesses 
and the economy by increasing prices, reducing choice and distorting innovation 
processes.135 
The beauty of this statement lies in its simplicity. It was not littered with jargon or 
overly technical economic theory and terms. ‘There was confidence, however, that laypeople 
would understand a simplified message about the effects of such conduct on them as 
consumers, namely, that cartels raised prices’.136 Indeed, consumers may not understand the 
technicalities of a cartel, but in the wake of the financial crisis and the ensuing proliferation of 
household debt,137 they will be more attuned to understanding when they have been ripped 
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off.138 One Parliamentary member illustrates this point by detailing her experience in dealing 
with members of the public: ‘Nothing irritates Australian consumers more than paying too 
much for goods and services that are offered in the market place. They absolutely hate it, and 
they talk to us politicians about it all the time’.139 
In addition to this rhetoric, the ACCC’s victory in Visy could not have come at a more 
apposite time:140 just before the 2008 financial crisis. The case ended in record penalties being 
imposed on one of Australia’s richest business people, Richard Pratt. The victory acted as a 
catalyst in the final push for introducing criminalisation of cartels in Australia. Heerey J’s 
judgment was particularly damning, and aptly underlined the adverse effects that a cartel can 
inflict on an ordinary consumer: ‘Every day every man, woman and child would use or 
consume something that at some stage has been transported in a cardboard box. The cartel in 
this case therefore had the potential for the widest possible effect’.141 
These rhetorical efforts, along with the implications of Visy, were harnessed by 
criminalisation proponents in debates on criminalisation reform. They were used as a medium 
through which the relevance and importance of the reform to the general public and government 
could be underscored. In the aftermath of the financial crisis, regulators in other jurisdictions 
should take heed of the ACCC’s efforts in promoting criminalisation, which were put forward 
in a manner with which both citizens and government could empathise. Such rhetoric leverages 
the financial hardship currently being experienced by consumers and markets criminalisation 
in a way that highlights its ability to protect the economy and protect consumers from having 
to pay higher prices – something which all consumers want, especially in times of austerity and 
economic recession. 
Mixed feeling towards ‘big business’ was also relied upon when making the case for 
cartel criminalisation in Australia.142 Whilst Australians take pride in the success of high 
profile business executives, social attitudes research simultaneously indicates that many 
Australians are of the view that ‘big business should have less power’.143 It seems, therefore, 
that trust towards big business has declined, fuelled by wide-ranging media coverage reporting 
corporate misconduct, in particular regarding well-known individuals. Mistrust has also been 
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compounded by political crackdowns on senior executive pay packages in times of economic 
downturn.144 This latter point – executive pay packages – is a globally controversial and topical 
debate at present. For example, executive remuneration has risen substantially not just for 
FTSE 100 companies in the wake of the financial crisis,145 but also companies more generally 
since the 1980s.146 Whilst excessive risk-taking was a contributory cause of the crisis, it was 
arguably exacerbated by executive remuneration structures. As Bebchuk and Spamann 
observe, ‘excessive risk-taking in the financial sector … played an important role in the major 
financial crisis [and] there is widespread concern that executive compensation arrangements 
could have encouraged [this behaviour]’.147 
Yet in times of such crises the shortfall of a country’s exchequer is often borne by 
ordinary citizens. Indeed, the economic crash led to austerity measures in many jurisdictions. 
It is no wonder, then, that ordinary taxpayers – footing the bill for the mistakes of ‘financial fat 
cats’ – feel aggrieved. For instance, despite both Europe and the US experiencing widespread 
unemployment as a consequence of the financial collapse, investment bankers and CEOs 
received, and continue to receive,148 exorbitant pay packets – some even larger than before.149 
These reports of burgeoning executive remuneration have traditionally been met with 
‘predictable gasps about over-payment’. 150  Conventional notions of fairness have become 
distorted, fomenting social unrest151 in many countries.152 With jurisdictions like Switzerland 
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having recently voted on national minimum wage increases153, the controversy over executive 
remuneration is really just a sub-debate of the wider discourse: inequality. It would seem, 
therefore, that executive remuneration has axiomatically become a political quandary, not just 
a financial stigma. 
On this analysis, cartel criminalisation would have signalled to the Australian public 
that government was prepared to become tough on big business. The exclusion of small 
businesses being subject to the reform was also key, portraying the ACCC as a ‘watchdog’ and 
egalitarian. The case for criminal sanctions was as much a moral one as it was economic. The 
ACCC said that cartel activity was solely for the ‘enrichment of greedy companies and 
executives that engage in it at the expense of Australian consumers and “honest” Australian 
businesses’.154 Framed in this manner, criminalisation was advanced not just in a way with 
which the public could greatly empathise, but was also made politically palatable as it offered 
a chance for government to signal to their electorate that they were prepared to become tough 
on ‘big business’. Public resentment towards ‘big business’ was exploited, whilst 
criminalisation also offered the opportunity for government to repair its image of being ‘run 
for a few big interests’ rather than ‘run for the benefit of all’.155 
In this context, the immorality of cartels could prove a useful argument in jurisdictions 
where there exists public resentment towards ‘big business’ and lavishly paid CEOs because it 
plays up the ‘little man versus big man’ debate – one which is really just a tangent of the much 
broader controversy of inequality. For example, last year Swiss voters approved the ‘fat-cat 
initiative’, introducing binding ‘Say on Pay’ in Switzerland.156 This again attests to the notion 
that executive remuneration is really a sub-set of broader political issues regarding wealth 
distribution, specifically, the increasing inequality gaps in developed countries. 157  Indeed, 
regulating the tension between market dynamism and effective redistribution is one of today’s 
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defining political challenges – a challenge which could prove a blessing in disguise for cartel 
criminalisation proponents.158  
The push for criminalisation in Australia also appealed to the country’s ethos of 
egalitarianism, specifically the ideal that all persons should be dealt with equally before the 
law was relied upon. A 2003 study showed that 81 percent of respondents agreed with the 
statement ‘when big businesses break the law they often go unpunished’.159 40 percent strongly 
agreed. Evidence also revealed that Australians perceived the criminal justice system as too 
lenient, with recent surveys evincing a consensus about the proposition that there should be 
‘stiffer sentences’ for those who ‘break the law’.160 
Utilising the idea of equality before the law could prove advantageous for other 
jurisdictions whose citizens hold much bitterness and resentment towards white-collar 
criminals,161 as analogies can be drawn between these offenders and cartelists.162 Ireland is a 
prime example: more than six years after the banking collapse, an inquiry is only now starting 
to take place, stemming from public and political outrage.163 Furthermore, the most culpable 
bank – Anglo Irish Bank (now IBRC) – recently saw two of its executives being found guilty 
of illegal lending, and yet the judge decided not to impose any prison sentence.164 This again 
exemplifies the reluctance of judges in this jurisdiction to impose custodial sentences for white-
collar crimes generally.  
‘Such disparity … contributes to the widespread perception among all segments of [a] 
population that … courts are not administering evenhanded justice’.165 Indeed, reluctance to 
sentence may ultimately prove fatal to public confidence in a jurisdiction’s legal system. 
Crimes by companies undermine the law’s moral foundations and ‘[t]his erosion of confidence 
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in the law is increased when it is perceived that blue-collar criminals go to jail and white-collar 
criminals do not’.166 This is just another form of inequality – one which is not purely about 
income. As an OECD report explains,  
[W]hen we talk about inequality, we must talk about more than income. Employment 
prospects, job quality, health outcomes, education and opportunities to build wealth 
over time matter for people’s well-being and are heavily determined by their socio-
economic status.167 
It is clear that in contrast to the UK experience, Australia’s policymakers and regulators took 
a far more pragmatic and holistic stance on their journey toward successful cartel 
criminalisation. The process was conducted in a manner that readily appealed to certain 
stakeholders – in particular, those whose support and participation would be vital for effective 
enforcement. In essence, they sought ‘first to understand, then to be understood’,168 resulting 
in an astute marketing strategy for cartel criminalisation – one which had the potential to 
ameliorate stakeholders’ concerns and ensure better standards of living. 
 
G. CONCLUSION 
Cartels are the most serious violation of antitrust law. They have no justifiable purpose and 
‘serve only to rob consumers of the tangible blessings of competition’.169 Criminalising cartels 
is rationalised on the basis that because it is company individuals who engage the cartel, 
sanctions should be levied on the individuals themselves in order to achieve proper deterrence. 
As Liman contends: ‘To the businessman … prison is the inferno, and conventional risk-reward 
analysis breaks down when the risk is jail. The threat of imprisonment, therefore, remains the 
most meaningful deterrent to antitrust violations’. 170  Moreover, the risk of individuals 
instigating a cartel is compounded in a recession, as managers are under pressure to achieve 
targets but under more difficult conditions. 
The US has been spoilt with success by its own criminalised antitrust regime. Yet it is 
a success that other jurisdictions have struggled to emulate. This paper has argued that the 
reason for such shortcomings has primarily been down to the lack of an enforcement culture. 
Criminal antitrust enforcement in the US was a bottom-up process, with key stakeholders – 
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politicians, the public, and enforcement agencies – all recognising the deterrent value of such 
a regime. As Scott Hammond maintains: ‘…the most effective way to deter and punish cartel 
activity is to hold culpable individuals accountable by seeking jail sentences’.171 There exists 
a strong consensus in the US that antitrust violations should be dealt with in much the same 
manner as criminal behaviour. This has significantly facilitated the use of criminal sanctions 
for Sherman Act violations. In contrast, support from the aforementioned stakeholders in other 
jurisdictions seems less apparent. Indeed, ‘[n]ational competition authorities outside of the 
[US] recognise … public education about the evils of [cartels] as a central component of their 
missions’.172 The UK’s lacklustre criminal cartel offence is an example of what can result from 
failing to develop an enforcement culture.173  
Educating the public is just one aspect, however. This paper has demonstrated both the 
importance and interrelatedness of all key players in the process of criminalisation. 
Enforcement agencies need funding and resources, which depends on the level of governmental 
support, which in turn can be influenced by the level of public support. Moreover, judges must 
be willing to impose custodial sentences and juries must be prepared to convict for deterrence 
to work. Juries are selected from the public, thereby necessitating public support, and judges 
must be afforded powers to enforce the new offences, therefore necessitating governmental 
support. Thus, the support of all key constituents is circular and interconnected, which is why 
a strong enforcement culture is so fundamental to the success of cartel criminalisation. 
Finally, this paper advanced rhetorical strategies for building an enforcement culture. 
In the aftermath of the financial crisis, regulators, in their campaign for criminalisation must 
take advantage of this opportune timing. General notions of financial hardship and inequality 
can be leveraged in emphasising the damaging effects of cartels on consumers. Indeed, a 2014 
OECD Report notes ‘the gap between the rich and poor has risen even faster since the global 
financial crisis than it did in the previous decade’ and ‘[t]he average income of the richest 10 
percent is now about 9.5 times that of the poorest 10 percent on average in OECD countries, 
up from 7 times 25 years ago’.174 Additionally, inequality is not just about income. Socio-
economic status influencing treatment before the law is another common feature of the current 
crisis, with those responsible often going unpunished. 
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These rhetorical strategies engage with why cartel criminalisation is necessary – 
something which the UK government was criticised for not doing.175 The strategies do this in 
a manner that exploits the universal concept of inequality, making cartel criminalisation both 
publicly desirable but also politically palatable. The appeal to government of criminal antitrust 
enforcement should be clear. Governments wishing to retain power over the long-term, 
particularly in forthcoming elections given consumers’ (ie the electorate’s) current financial 
status, would surely be amenable to a reform that could better ensure competitive prices for 
goods and services. In the aftermath of the global recession, living standards are a consumer’s 
greatest concern.
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